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Abstract: Following up on its predecessor in this Journal, the article defends 
philosophy as a guide to making and analyzing art; identifies Cubist solutions to 
the Prometheus Challenge, including a novel analysis of Picasso’s Les 
Demoiselles d’Avignon; defines a new concept of aesthetic attitude; proves the 
compatibility of Prometheus Challenge artworks with logic; and explains why 
Plato would have welcomed such artworks in his ideal state.   
Keywords: aesthetic attitude, Cubism, Impressionism, Locke, mimesis, Monet, 
perceptual relativity, Picasso, Plato, primary and secondary qualities. 
 
First, Some Explanatory Background 
Question: Cusmariu 2017 gave the impression that your artwork consists only 
of sculptures that meet the Prometheus Challenge. Is this impression correct? 
Answer: No. Below are four pieces I made after learning stone carving at the Art 
League School in Alexandria, Virginia in 1998. Family was made the same year as 
Counterpoint 1. The transition to Mereological sculpture and a new paradigm 
occurred in a matter of months. 
 
 
Question: What considerations guided the sculptures you created before 
applying philosophical theories such as Phenomenalism and Mereology?  
Answer: I realized very early that sculpture could go in a new direction based on 
an elementary fact about vision: what we see depends on where we stand. That 
is, objects such as tables and chairs present one appearance from one viewing 
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angle and a different appearance from another viewing angle.1 This fact is not a 
cause for confusion. There is no need to walk all the way around a car, for 
example, to make sure that it is a car or that it is the same car. This lead to the 
following argument.2 
Argument A 
A1. The appearance an ordinary object X presents at any viewing angle is 
consistent with the concept of X. 
A2. If the appearance X presents at any viewing angle is consistent with the 
concept of X, the appearance X presents at a specific viewing angle is a basis for 
inferring appearances not presented at that viewing angle. 
Therefore, 
A3. The appearance an ordinary object X presents at a specific viewing angle is 
a basis for inferring appearances not presented at that viewing angle. 
While figurative sculptures such as Michelangelo’s David and abstract 
sculptures such as Archipenko’s Woman Combing Her Hair are not ordinary 
objects, nevertheless, A1 and A2 are true of them and the argument to A3 goes 
through.  
Moreover, it became fairly obvious that A3 has an aesthetic counterpart 
that is true of traditional as well as modern sculpture.  
A3*. Aesthetic attributes of the appearance an art object presents at a specific 
viewing angle are a basis for inferring aesthetic attributes of appearances not 
presented at that viewing angle. 
The question at this point became whether sculpture could be composed 
such that A3 and A3* were not true of them.  
 
Question: Would you illustrate with examples? 
Answer: Bagatelle I and Bagatelle II are my earliest experiments in perceptual 
relativity.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 The concept of perceptual relativity can be traced as far back as Plato’s Republic, specifically 
598a5-a8 (Cooper 1997, 1202). See the section below on Plato’s critique of art. 
2 Standard lighting conditions may be assumed for purposes of this argument. I realize that 
this assumption raises complications in the analysis of Cubist artworks where light is an 
aesthetic factor in its own right but they are not relevant to Prometheus Challenge artworks 
analyzed here and in Cusmariu 2017.  
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Thus, physical and aesthetic attributes of View-Ia are not inferable from 
those of View-Ib and vice-versa. The same is true of View-IIa and View-IIb.   
 
Question: Did you make stone sculptures that built on the Bagatelles? 
Answer: Yes. It is easy to see that A3 and A3* do not hold for the two views of 
Cleo (2001) and Nici (2002), which are 180 degrees of arc apart. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: What other arguments define your Prometheus Challenge sculptures? 
Answer: Arguments B and C express key aspects of these sculptures. 
Argument B 
B1. If the appearances objects present are treated singly, their physical and 
aesthetic attributes can be treated singly. 
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B2. If physical and aesthetic attributes are treated singly, one set of physical 
and aesthetic attributes can be apparent at one viewing angle and an 
incompatible set of attributes can be apparent at another viewing angle. 
Therefore, 
B3. If the appearances objects present are treated singly, one set of physical and 
aesthetical attributes can be apparent at one viewing angle and an incompatible 
set of attributes can be apparent at another viewing angle. 
B4. In Phenomenalist and Mereological sculptures, appearances presented are 
treated singly. 
Therefore, 
B5. In Phenomenalist and Mereological sculptures, one set of physical and 
aesthetical attributes can be apparent at one viewing angle and an incompatible 
set of attributes can be apparent at another viewing angle. 
Argument C 
C1. If X is an ordinary physical object, the appearances X presents displayed on 
a rotating carousel form a continuous set. 
C2. The appearances Phenomenalist and Mereological sculptures present 
displayed a rotating carousel do not form a continuous set. 
Therefore, 
C3. Phenomenalist and Mereological sculptures are not ordinary physical 
objects.   
Philosophy as a Guide to Art and its Analysis 
Question: In the abstract of Cusmariu 2017, you stated that you were able to 
make progress in sculpture thanks to philosophical analysis, which you 
described as “probably a first in the history of art” (Cusmariu 2017, 17). Were 
you implying that no other analytic philosophers have produced art? 
Answer: No. I was aware that two analytic philosophers, Arthur Danto and Keith 
Lehrer, had also produced art – paintings and drawings. Danto worked on 
aesthetics and was also an art critic. He came to Brown for a talk when I was in 
graduate school. Lehrer is also a Brown Ph.D. Danto’s artwork can be viewed at 
http://artcollection.wayne.edu/exhibitions/REIMAGINING_SPIRIT.php and 
Lehrer’s at http://www.keithlehrer.com/. As far as I could determine, their 
artwork does not reflect identifiable theories of analytic philosophy.3 
Question: While it is surprising that analytic philosophers who made art 
apparently did not find it necessary or useful to look to their own discipline for 
                                                        
3 In 1927, Wittgenstein carved a terra cotta statue of a young girl’s head that likewise does not 
reflect any philosophical theories or the influence of developments in 20th century sculpture 
such as Cubism. An image of this sculpture can be seen at 
http://www.flashq.org/pix/sculptur.jpg. Accessed 24 August 2017.   
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guidance, the fact that artists have not done so is not surprising. What is your 
explanation? 
Answer: Reasons such as the following may be cited:  
 Artists have expressed serious doubts that philosophy can yield anything 
they would consider useful or even relevant. 
Tristan Tzara (1951, 248), chief provocateur of the Dada avant-garde, 
pointedly asked: “What good have the philosophers done us?  Have they helped 
us to take a single step forward?”  Barnett Newman went even further.  Speaking 
in 1952 at the Fourth Annual Woodstock Conference, Newman famously quipped: 
“Aesthetics is for me like ornithology must be for the birds,” adding that he 
considered “the artist and the aesthetician to be mutually exclusive terms.” 
Anatole France (1895, 219) rejected the legitimacy of aesthetics on grounds that 
intellectual reasoning could never provide a basis for preferring one aesthetic 
judgment to another, adding “les œuvres que tout le monde admire sont celles que 
personne n’examine.” (The works that everyone admires are those that no one 
studies.) Wallace Stevens (1981, 488) poked not-so-gentle fun at “… the 
swarming activities of the formulae … a philosopher practicing scales on his 
piano.” 
 Familiarizing non-philosophers with the increasingly technical contexts 
of philosophy is not considered a high priority in academia. 
Philosophy departments offer courses in the philosophy of art and 
occasionally philosophy through art but not philosophy for artists explaining 
how art can be based on philosophy.  The divide between art and philosophy is 
especially wide in the case of what has come to be called, since the publication of 
Bertrand Russell’s “On Denoting” in 1905, analytic philosophy. Artists will find 
Russell’s analysis of “the so-and-so is F” utterly mystifying, likewise the puzzles 
(Russell’s term) it was intended to solve.  Other key achievements will not fare 
any better, e.g., Tarski’s semantic conception of truth (Tarski 1944); 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument (Wittgenstein 1953); Quine’s critique 
of the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quine 1951); and Kripke’s attack on the 
identity theory of mind (Kripke 1980). The fact that most artists would find 
these milestones inaccessible does not lessen their significance, of course, but it 
is a strong indication that the conceptual divide between art and analytic 
philosophy is not easily bridged.4 
 Logic, analysis and methodology in general are often seen as detrimental 
to the creative process in art. 
The author of a book on Henry Moore reportedly offered to share his 
analysis with the sculptor, who demurred – the ‘paralysis by analysis’ syndrome 
that professional athletes also dread. Here is Tzara again, in the context of 
explaining Dada (Tzara 1989, 250): “There is no logic … Any attempt to 
conciliate an inexplicable momentary state with logic strikes me as a boring kind 
                                                        
4 An attempt by the conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth to bridge this gap is discussed below. 
Arnold Cusmariu 
180 
of game.”  Kandinsky went even further (Lindsay and Vergo 1982, 827): “Nothing 
is more dangerous in art than to arrive at a ‘manner of expression’ by logical 
conclusions. My advice, then, is to mistrust logic in art.” In a 1964 interview 
(Merkert 1986, 166), David Smith stated “I think the minute I see a rule or a 
method or an introduction to success in some direction, I’m quick to leave it – or 
I want to leave it.” The first of Sol LeWitt’s “Sentences on Conceptual Art” (LeWitt 
1973, 75-6) reads: “Conceptual artists are mystics rather than rationalists.  They 
leap to conclusions that logic cannot reach.” In “Lamia,” Keats famously wrote 
(Keats 2001 [1820], 205): 
… Do not all charms fly 
At the mere touch of cold philosophy? 
… Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings 
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line, 
Empty the haunted air … 
Unweave a rainbow. 
 Philosophers themselves have rejected the idea that, to be worth 
studying, their subject must show practical impact. 
The following comments exemplify the point regarding aesthetics: 
(Bosanquet 1892, xi): “Aesthetic theory is a branch of philosophy, and exists for 
the sake of knowledge and not as guide to practice. … It is important to insist 
that the aesthetic philosopher does not commit the impertinence of invading 
the artist’s domain with an apparatus belli of critical principles and precepts.”  
(Carritt 1914, 3): “Philosophical reflection upon our activities proposes neither 
an improvement of them nor a final formula which will save us from exercising 
them. It proposes simply to think about those activities, and the process of 
thinking is the valuable result.  Aesthetics is for aesthetics’ sake.”  
(Vivas 1955, 192): “Contemporary aesthetics tends to be an autonomous 
discipline concerned chiefly with problems of philosophic method and with 
epistemological issues, and to ignore the problems of criticism and the 
contemporary situation in art.”  
 Expanding on Vivas’ comment, no philosophical discipline considers it to 
be within its purview to provide even basic conceptual guidance to 
artists. 
The sort of analysis undertaken here and in Cusmariu 2009, 2015A, 2015B, 
2016 and 2017 is without precedent.5 While books and articles on philosophical 
                                                        
5 It would take us too far afield to determine the extent to which (if any) philosophical theories 
influenced other writers on art and as such might have preceded my efforts. I must leave for 
another time analysis of Arthur Danto’s contributions to art criticism, (e.g., 1988, 1997, 2005), 
who was a philosopher as well as an art critic; or the writings of influential art critics who 
were not philosophers such as Leo Steinberg (1972), Meyer Shapiro (1978 and 1997), Robert 
Hughes (1980), and Clement Greenberg (1961 and 1999). From a methodological point of 
view, however, my precedent claim is justified. Art criticism, including Danto’s, is descriptive 
and sometimes critical but not argumentative in the formal logical sense exemplified by, for 
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aesthetics discuss metaphysical issues such as the ontology of artworks and the 
meaning or justification of aesthetic judgments, philosophers consider it 
inappropriate to offer conceptual guidance to artists, not even by way of 
suggestions as to where artists might look if they wished to ‘get smart’ on what 
philosophy has to offer.  
Question: What about David Smith’s comment (Merkert 1986, 166) that “the 
minute I see a rule or method, I’m quick to leave it.”? 
Answer: The French poet Charles Baudelaire is closer to my way of thinking on 
the matter. As he famously remarked (1976 [1863], 715), “everything that is 
beautiful and noble is the result of reason and calculation.” Phenomenalism and 
Mereology are relevant to sculpture as conceptual guidance on how to think 
about physical objects, not as ‘rules or methods’ on how to make art. Sculpture 
should find such guidance valuable. After all, it is about creating objects with 
aesthetic properties. 
Question: What about Sol LeWitt’s comment that “conceptual artists are mystics 
rather than rationalists”; that such artists “leap to conclusions that logic cannot 
reach,” which seems to be amplifying the point that Tzara was trying to make?  
Answer: We should not confuse the process of discovery with its outcome. Just 
because the process of discovery often does not follow a predictable sequence of 
steps logically related to one another, does not mean that logic cannot fathom 
the discovery itself. 
There may well be a sense in which LeWitt followed a path in creating his 
artworks that is not easily explainable in rational terms. The outcome, however, 
is predictably geometric. Moreover, placing his structures (as he called them) on 
a construction site might well render them indistinguishable from materials 
already there such as scaffolding or neatly stacked piles of iron bars. Not only 
that, the structures show an extremely rudimentary understanding of 
mereology’s aesthetic potential, which is also true of Donald Judd’s piles of 
bricks. David Smith’s steel volumes welded on top of one another at various 
angles are mereologically superior to LeWitt’s grids and Judd’s bricks but are 
still relatively elementary explorations of Mereology’s aesthetic potential. 
Question: You would have to agree with Kandinsky that your sculptures 
exemplifying discontinuous attributes and interweaving forms owe their 
‘manner of expression’ to philosophical theories about physical objects grounded 
in logic, such as Phenomenalism and Mereology (P&M), respectively. How would 
you persuade him that logic has not thereby set a ‘dangerous’ precedent in art 
and should not be ‘mistrusted’?6  
                                                                                                                                           
example, Arguments A-C above; or theoretical to the degree exemplified here and my other 
cited work. 
6 Kandinsky studied law and economics at the University of Moscow in the late 1880s and 
eventually became a professor. What exposure to logic he may have had is unclear; most likely 
Aristotelian logic. It is also unclear whether he studied philosophy at any point. 
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Answer: Kandinsky’s concerns can be allayed by noting that P&M sculptures 
block key physical and aesthetic inferences, of which there are three types: (a) 
within a single sculpture belonging to either solution category; (b) across 
sculptures within either solution category; and (c) across sculptures belonging to 
different solution categories. 
Question: Would you illustrate each type with specific examples? 
Answer: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Physical and aesthetic attributes in Alar-1 & 2 are not inferable from one 
another. This is also true of Peace-1 & 2, Counterpoint-2a & 2b and 
Counterpoint-4a & 4b.   
(b) The transition from wing to flame in Alar-1 to Alar-2 does not imply the 
transition from wing to bird in Peace-1 to Peace-2. Likewise, the transition from 
the interweaving forms of Counterpoint-2a to those of Counterpoint-2b does not 
imply the transition from the interweaving forms of Counterpoint-4a to those of 
Counterpoint-4b.  
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(c) We are justified in generalizing and stating that the design of discontinuous 
attribute sculptures does not imply the design of interweaving form sculptures, 
and vice versa. This is not surprising because Phenomenalism and Mereology 
are not equivalent theories. 
These points also address Tzara’s concern that logic in art would be ‘a 
boring kind of game.’ Sculptures based on theories about physical objects from 
analytic philosophy certainly do not come across as ‘a philosopher practicing 
scales on his piano’ (Stevens); nor is it the case that ‘all charms fly at the mere 
touch of cold philosophy’ (Keats.) There is nothing boringly repetitive or dry-as-
dust about them; there is not even a hint of a (predictable) distinctive style, 
which is often associated with a specific artist. 
On the other hand, with all due respect, Henry Moore’s reclining figures 
and Alexander Calder’s mobiles are such that ‘if you’ve seen one, you’ve seen 
them all.’ Inferences from what is seen to what is not seen easily go through each 
time. If I may put it this way, the aesthetic ‘delta’ from one piece to the next is 
remarkably small.7 
Question: Degas, Manet, Dali, Picasso and Lipchitz proved that incompatible 
attributes can be combined in an artwork without explicit awareness of the 
concepts and techniques involved. Isn’t this true? 
Answer: Yes, but … Degas and Manet each made only one painting that applied 
mirror imaging. Dali made none8 and only a few seeing-as pictures.9 Lipchitz’s 
output was prodigious but he made only one seeing-as sculpture. None of his 
Cubist sculptures meet the Prometheus Challenge.10 Picasso produced only one 
other seeing-as sculpture, Goat Skull and Bottle (1951)11 and only very few that 
meet the challenge, Les Demoiselles d’Avignon (1907) being the most famous (see 
next section).  
The real issue is whether more Prometheus Challenge artworks would 
have been created had artists been aware of the concepts and techniques 
involved instead of going entirely by talent and intuition. I believe so. I see no 
reasons why what was true of me couldn’t be true of others as well. 
                                                        
7  Compare Henry Moore’s Reclining Figure 1936, which can be seen at 
https://gerryco23.wordpress.com/2011/08/19/the-hepworth-wakefield/henry-moore-
reclining-figure-1936/ with one made more than thirty years later, Reclining Figure 1969-70, 
which can be seen at https://static01.nyt.com/images/2016/04/05/arts/05COLUMBIA-
web/05COLUMBIA-web-jumbo.jpg.   
8 Dali’s use of mirrors in a 1971 stereoscopic experiment does not solve the Prometheus 
Challenge. Image available at https://www.salvador-dali.org/en/museums/dali-theatre-
museum-in-figueres/the-collection/124/dali-seen-from-the-back-painting-gala-from-the-
back-eternalized-by-six-virtual-corneas-provisionally-reflected-by-six-real-mirrors. Accessed 
5 July, 2017. 
9 See Descharnes and Néret 2013. 
10 See Wilkinson 1996 and Wilkinson 2000. 
11 See Spiess 1971, 178 for a photo of Goat Skull and Bottle. 
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Question: The conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth claims to have found useful 
guidance in analytic philosophy (Harrison & Wood 2003, 852-860). What about 
that? 
Answer: While I applaud the effort, it is evidently possible to pick the wrong 
guidance or misunderstand it, as the following passages from Kosuth’s essay “Art 
after Philosophy” show. 
(Harrison and Wood 2003, 857): Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, 
if viewed within their context – as art – they provide no information 
whatsoever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is a 
presentation of the artist’s intention, that is, he is  saying that that 
particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art. Thus, that it is 
art is true a priori (which is what Judd means when he states that ‘if someone 
calls it art, it’s art’) … To repeat, what art has in common with logic and 
mathematics is that it is a tautology; i.e., the ‘art idea’ (or ‘work’) and art are the 
same and can be appreciated as art without going outside the context of art for 
verification.  
There is only space to indicate some of the problems with these comments. 
 As the main philosophical source for his views, Kosuth uses A.J. Ayer’s 
book Language, Truth and Logic, which he cites in a footnote but without 
giving the publication date (Harrison and Wood 2003, 860.) Thus, he 
fails to mention that he is quoting from a 1952 reprint of the 1946 
second edition in which, with typical British understatement, Ayer 
admits (1952, 5) that he had underestimated the difficulty of the 
questions addressed in his 1936 first edition. 
 Kosuth either was unaware or simply ignored the fact that by 1969, 
when his article was published, logical positivism had been battered by 
decades of criticism and was dead. Second, Quine 1951 presented 
serious objections to the analytic-synthetic distinction, one of the ‘two 
dogmas of empiricism.’ Third, Ayer held (1952, 113) that aesthetic 
judgments “express certain feelings and evoke a certain response” and 
would not have agreed with Kosuth’s use of ‘analytic,’ ‘tautology’ and ‘a 
priori’ to characterize aesthetic judgments. Fourth, Kosuth’s application 
of these terms to aesthetic judgments is non-standard and as such is 
philosophically suspect. Finally, quoting the views of a philosopher as 
the last word on an issue, e.g., “as Ayer has stated” (Harrison and Wood 
2003, 858), is appealing to an authority that no philosopher would ever 
claim to possess.  
 Kosuth’s ‘copy-paste’ approach is naïve to say the least. Correct 
application of philosophical concepts to artmaking requires technical 
competence in the subject as well as awareness of the larger 
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controversies at stake. If Kosuth’s conceptual art is based on logical 
positivism, so much the worse for it.12   
Question: Okay, logical positivism is a dead end in art. What other philosophical 
theories can help artists ‘take a step forward’?  
Answer:  As already noted, philosophical theories about physical objects such as 
Phenomenalism and Mereology make possible a sort of physical deconstruction 
of objects, which is but a short step from the sort of aesthetic deconstruction at 
the foundation of much modern art. Awareness of these theories would have 
enabled artists to move in new and exciting directions much earlier, 
independently of meeting the Prometheus Challenge.13  
Potentially fruitful guidance from other philosophical sources can be cited 
as well – beginning, in fact, with Plato. For example, I show below in the section 
on Plato’s critique of art that he was aware of perceptual relativity and made a 
point that has since become the merest commonplace in figurative art: the focus 
is on how objects appear; specifically, how they appear to the artist. As 
Argument B above showed, from this it is only a short step to taking the 
appearances objects present singly, as entities in their own right, and then 
combine them to produce artworks that no longer exemplify correspondence to 
reality – which explains much modern art. Artists could have gotten away much 
sooner from the mimetic, ‘copy’ mentality Plato criticized.14 
Artistic guidance could have been obtained from Plato’s solution to the 
problem of universals, his Theory of Forms.15 The sharp ontological distinction 
between existence and exemplification has an aesthetic counterpart: artists can 
                                                        
12 Evidently thinking he was being original, the art critic Jacques Rivière wrote in 1912 
(Harrison and Wood 2003, 191): “The knowledge we have of an object is, as I said before, a 
complex sum of perceptions.”  
13 In an article titled “Art and Objecthood” (Harrison and Wood 2003, 835-846), Michael Fried 
never mentions philosophical theories about objecthood, nor does he define “objecthood.” 
Philosophers have grappled for a long time with questions about the nature of substance, the 
distinction between substance and attribute, the relation between substance and attribute, the 
nature of attributes, and so on. In analytic philosophy, these questions quickly become 
technical and require advanced training to even comprehend. Second-order logic makes 
precise quantification over properties and relations. See Shapiro 2000. 
14 As far as I have been able to determine, artists have not attempted to deal with Plato’s 
critique of art, certainly nothing comparable to Elizabethan poet Philip Sidney’s celebrated An 
Apology for Poetry (Katherine Duncan-Jones 2009 [1583]). For example, the voluminous 
collection of Kandisky’s writings on art, which is nearly 1,000-pages long, does not even 
mention Plato in the index (Lindsay and Vergo 1982, 922). The same is true of Motherwell 
1951, a 400-page volume that includes selected writings of Tristan Tzara and other Dada 
painters and poets. Marius Hentea’s biography of Tzara (Hentea 2014) also makes no mention 
of Plato. I have not found evidence that Tzara ever read philosophy books.   
15 In a 1912 essay (Harrison and Wood 2003, 188), Guillaume Apollinaire observed: “The 
young painters offer us works that are more cerebral than sensual. They are moving further 
and further away from the old art of optical illusions and literal proportions, in order to 
express the grandeur of metaphysical forms.” 
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treat properties as entities in their own right and then combine them without 
exemplifying correspondence to reality.  
Awareness of later philosophical developments such as the distinction 
between primary and secondary properties16 (Locke 1924 [1690], Berkeley 
1979 [1713], Nolan 2011) and Kant’s critique of it17 would have enabled painters 
to ‘take a step forward’ much sooner in their treatment of picture space. Primary 
properties such as shape and volume can be treated for artistic purposes as if 
they were secondary properties, the paradigm case being color, which became 
an end in itself in modern art.  
Question: What specific philosophical theories can shed new light on key 
developments in art other than Phenomenalism and Mereology?18 
Answer: Berkeley’s understanding of the distinction between primary and 
secondary properties can be used to explain several developments. 
 In Impression, Sunrise (1872), from which Impressionism derived its 
name, Monet did away with the centuries-old concept of a painting as a 
line drawing with color on it. He defined primary properties such as the 
shape and size of his boats and the space between them by means of 
patches of color.19 
 Following Monet’s lead, Seurat used thousands of tiny colored points to 
define the contents of picture space, including shape, distance, and 
perspective. 
 In his landscapes, Cezanne also defined picture space by means of 
secondary properties, though his color patches are more sharply defined 
than Monet’s. 
 Rothko’s multiforms push the relationship between color and space to 
the point of synonymy, as do paintings of other abstract expressionists 
such a Pollock.  
                                                        
16 As drawn by Berkeley (but not by Locke), the distinction is between properties that are said 
to “exist really in bodies” (primary) and properties that are said to “exist nowhere but in the 
mind” (Berkeley 1979, 22, First Dialog). The sweetness of honey is secondary while its 
viscosity is primary.  
17 Kant (1950 [1783], 37) rejected Locke’s distinction, writing (original italics) “all the 
properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely its appearance.” A careful 
analysis of Kant’s contributions to metaphysics and epistemology is Van Cleve 1999.  
18 Danto writes (2005, 152): “Giacometti was passionate about philosophical conversation but 
mainly about the phenomenology of perception. We used to discuss Bertrand Russell’s idea 
that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense data.” Giacometti’s Walking Man 
sculpture series, for which he is most famous, seem to me to exemplify Solipsism rather than 
Phenomenalism.  
19 The cubist painter Fernand Leger (1881-1955) would have agreed with my analysis of 
Impressionism, writing (Harrison and Wood 2003, 202-3): “For the impressionists, a green 
apple and a red rug is no longer the relationship between two objects, but the relationship 
between two tones, a green and a red.”  
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Question: What specific criteria would you use to argue that your Prometheus 
Challenge artworks that apply philosophical theories represent ‘a step forward?’  
Answer: Here are two criteria relative to the Counterpoint series: (1) whether 
the interweaving forms concept has been productive; (2) whether there is 
discernible progress from one artwork to the next in regard to basic aesthetic 
criteria such as composition and execution. 
The productiveness of the interweaving-forms concept is easy to show.  
There are photos of ten Counterpoint sculptures in the Appendix of Cusmariu 
2017 (47). I have seven more sculptures in the works, of which three have been 
completed. Seventeen artworks (three more to come) based on the same 
philosophical theory is evidence of productivity perhaps comparable to series of 
sculptures by artists such as Lipchitz’s Variation on a Chisel (Wilkinson 2000, 53-
57) and Smith’s Cubi (Merkert 1986, 95-97).  
As to discernible progress, let us compare photos of Counterpoint 2 (C2, 
left) and Counterpoint 10 (C10, right), made only about a year apart in 2002 and 
2003. 
 
The level of skill required to carve (and polish) C10 is significantly greater. 
C10 includes of a lot more figures. C2 figures are all vertical but that is not the 
case in C10, which means more and more difficult compositional problems had 
to be solved. C2 figures appear locked in an embrace as the principal relationship, 
whereas the relationships exemplified in C10 are much more varied and there 
are more of them. C10 combines figurative as well as abstract volumes, whereas 
C2 volumes are largely figurative. Grain and color were fairly uniform in C2 but 
that proved not to be the case when I started to carve C10, which posed 
additional problems. These comparisons will yield similar conclusions about 
discernible aesthetic progress in other Counterpoint sculptures.  
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Cubism and the Prometheus Challenge 
Question: Does Picasso’s 1907 masterpiece Les Demoiselles d’Avignon20 (LDA), 
which is considered to have launched Cubism, meet the Prometheus Challenge?  
Answer: Yes. I only realized this while working on this article. 
 It is now possible to answer correctly for the first time a fundamental 
question about LDA that sheds new light on this famous picture. 
 I disagree with Arthur Danto that “nobody really understands it [LDA]” 
(2005 [2001], 124). Prometheus Challenge analysis does that.  
 I disagree with Danto that “nobody is even able to say whether it is a 
success or a failure” (2005 [2001], 124).  
 I disagree with Clement Greenberg that “[t]he Demoiselles d’Avignon, 
superb as it is, lacks conclusive unity” (1961, 63). 
 LDA is more than a success; it is a tour de force. The Prometheus 
Challenge is met by means of several solution types: mirror-imaging, 
image overlapping and seeing-as vision, giving the picture an 
extraordinary degree of ‘conclusive unity.’ 
 I disagree with received opinion concerning LDA’s alleged resemblance 
to pictures by Cezanne (Les Grandes Baigneuses), El Greco (Opening of the 
Fifth Seal) and Matisse (Le Bonheur de Vivre), the last of which is 
supposed to have prompted Picasso to paint LDA. As a Spanish painter, 
Picasso most likely saw himself in competition not with two Frenchmen 
and a Greek but rather with his compatriot Velazquez and his most 
famous picture, Las Meninas (1656). LDA gives ‘las meninas,’ ‘ladies in 
waiting,’ an entirely different meaning.  
The basic question that has yet to be answered correctly is this:  
How many figures does LDA show?  
Danto summarized the standard answer (2005 [2001], 124):21 
Here are five women in all – three classical figures to the viewer’s left, two 
masked women to the right, one of them, her back to us, squatting. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
20 Though completed in 1907, LDA went on public display in 1916. It is now at the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York and can be viewed online at 
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/79766?locale=en.   
21 The standard answer may also be found in the following: Andersen 2002, ix; Blereau 2015, 
14; Bois 2001, 37, 48; Chave 1994, 599; Cohen 2015, 25; Fry 1966, 12-15; Garb 2001, 55, 56; 
Gersh-Nešić 2015, 17; Golding 1988, 33-49; Golding 2001, 22, 26; Green 2001A, 5; Green 
2001B, 129, 134, 135; Leighten 2001, 93; Lomas 2001, 104; Richardson 1996, 11; Rosenbloom 
2001, 15; Rubin 1994, 69; curator Ann Temkin on the Museum of Modern Art website 
https://www.moma.org/; and Wikipedia. 
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An Internalist22 Analysis: Six Figures  
 
LDA combines as well as anticipates several techniques exemplified in 
later Picasso pictures that meet the Prometheus Challenge. 
 The Three Dancers (1925) contained an ambiguity in the middle figure 
that required special vision to detect (Cusmariu 2017, 34). 
 Bust of a Young Woman (1926) shows overlapping images and shared 
body parts (Cusmariu 2017, 27). 
 Girl before A Mirror (1932) used mirroring to show images inconsistent 
with one another and with the concept of mirroring itself (Cusmariu 
2017, 27).  
The number of figures LDA shows has been misunderstood because a key 
detail of the squatting figure has been misunderstood. The detail concerns what 
appears as the head of the figure, which has been interpreted as a ‘mask’ by 
Danto and many others. There are three sources of incompatibility here and as 
such three possible solutions to the Prometheus Challenge. 
Incompatibility A: The head belongs to a customer in the act of having sex 
with the prostitute on top of him, her body completely obscuring his. A male 
head ‘glued’ atop a female body creates a jarring incompatibility and also 
comments on the revolting nature of bordello sex. The woman is shown without 
a head and the man with only a head. The implication is that neither is ‘all there’ 
as copulation is taking place.   
Incompatibility B: The head is a mirror image of a customer sitting in a 
chair outside picture space trying to decide which prostitute to pick. Judging by 
the man’s bewildered look, he is either a first-time visitor and dreads the 
experience ahead, or else is revolted by the appearance of the women available. 
The head bears some resemblance to Picasso as he looked in his 1907 self-
portrait (currently at the National Gallery of the Czech Republic in Prague), who 
was known to have frequented bordellos. 
Incompatibility C: The head image is ambiguous, being an overlapping 
male-female composite. To see the female aspect, block the right eye (on the 
viewer’s left) and then compare the result with the head of the right-most figure, 
whose face appears scarred by venereal disease: The slope of the nose, the jaw 
line and the mouth all match.23 
 
                                                        
22 Internalism in art criticism is what others have called formalism, i.e., an artwork is to be 
interpreted in terms of its aesthetic properties. Zangwill 2001 and Mitrović 2011 discuss 
formalism in aesthetics.  
23 Brassaï 1999 [1964], 32 asks whether African art played a role in the creation of LDA and 
answers on behalf of Picasso that the painter saw African sculptures “only after he had 
completed the canvas.” 
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An Externalist24 Analysis: Two Figures 
Here is an analysis of LDA unrelated to the Prometheus Challenge based on the 
Christian doctrine of The Fall of Man (Genesis 3). 
 
Eve is a prostitute in the Garden of Eden bordello, a postlapsarian ‘fallen 
world.’ On left, she is the welcoming madam holding open the curtain. The two 
nubile figures in the center are Eve using her charms to lure Adam. Next, Eve’s 
face is scarred by venereal disease as punishment for biting the apple. As the 
squatting figure, she is servicing Adam trapped under her, his face distorted in 
climax.25 In the foreground is a medley of forbidden fruit from the Tree of 
Knowledge. The serpent has slithered away.26   
 
Question: Can you cite other Cubist solutions to the Prometheus Challenge? 
Answer: Let us have a look at two Cubist artworks exemplifying image 
overlapping by Jean Metzinger (1883-1956). Metzinger was also a prominent art 
theorist (see Harrison and Wood 2003, 184-85, 194-201.) 
Painted in 1913, Metzinger’s Woman with a Fan is at the Art Institute of 
Chicago and can be seen at http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/9527 
(accessed 19 September 2017).27 
 Several views of a woman are superimposed a few degrees of arc apart.  
 In the foreground view, she is shown in profile wearing a bowler hat, a 
heavy overcoat, and a colorful tie.  
 In the middle-ground view, her head has been rotated clockwise slightly 
toward the light source. The right eye is shared with the foreground view, 
as are the lips. Wavy hair is now visible on left.   
 In the background view, her head has been rotated clockwise again until 
she faces the viewer, some 90 degrees of arc away from the profile view. 
The wavy hair is now in upper right.   
                                                        
24 Externalist art criticism asserts the conditional “if non-aesthetic factors (psychoanalytic, 
political, social, religious, historical, etc.,) are assumed, artwork X means Y.” Modus tollens can 
show that the antecedent of this conditional is problematic by showing that “artwork X means 
Y” is problematic for various reasons, e.g., inconsistency with the artist’s stated or implied 
intent. Outlandish forms of externalist art criticism are skewered effectively in Kimball 2004. 
The deeper issue is whether externalist art criticism commits the Naturalistic Fallacy (Moore 
1903). 
25 Brassaï writes (1999 [1964], 223): “‘Art is never chaste,’ he [Picasso] tells me one day.” 
26 This interpretation is consistent with Picasso’s rebellious nature. He lived to be 91 and 
flouted a lot more than artistic conventions during his long life. 
27 Metzinger superimposed images a few degrees of arc apart in three other pictures: Woman 
at the Window (1912), Nude in Front of a Mirror (1912), and The Smoker (1914). Metzinger 
was a Pointillist early on, e.g., Nude in a Landscape (1905), Woman with a Hat (1906), and 
Bacchante (1906).   
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 The three views also share clothing attributes, e.g., the hat, the coat, and 
the fan. 
 The three views could be superimposed over one another as animation 
cells and ‘flipped’ to simulate motion, resulting in a dynamic picture.  
Painted in 1916, Metzinger’s Lady at Her Dressing Table is in a private 
collection and can be seen at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Femme_au_miroir 
(accessed 19 September 2017.) 
 A woman standing in front of a dressing table and holding a mirror 
appears simultaneously clothed and unclothed – note the bellybutton.  
 Her left breast is seen from the front and from the side simultaneously.  
 The right side of her face is flat and seems to be a mirror reflection, while 
the left side reflects the colors of her clothing.  
 The rectangular shoulders and cylindrical neck contrast and are 
incompatible with the slender and realistically painted arms.  
 Overlap between images associated with the woman and background 
shapes serves to provide balance and aesthetic unity. 
The Prometheus Challenge and the Aesthetic Attitude 
Question: Is there a difference between the experience of perceiving artworks 
such as sculptures and the experience of perceiving ordinary physical objects? If 
so, is this difference to be described in terms of adopting an aesthetic attitude? 
How do you respond to objections to the effect that the aesthetic attitude is a 
myth?  
Answer: George Dickie’s critique of the aesthetic attitude in his well-known 
paper (Dickie 1960) seems to have withstood the test of time according to one 
recent writer (Zemach 1997, 33). Here is Dickie’s case stated in proper argument 
form: 
1. The aesthetic attitude has been defined in terms of ‘distancing,’ the mental 
state of ‘being distanced,’ and the mental state of ‘disinterested attention.’ 
2. ‘Distancing,’ ‘being distanced’ and ‘disinterested attention’ mean nothing 
more than ignoring sources of distraction and focusing on the matter at hand – 
a play, a painting, a poem, a piece of music, and so on. 
3. Therefore, adopting an aesthetic attitude means nothing more than ignoring 
sources of distraction and focusing attention on, or paying attention to, the 
matter at hand – a play, a painting, a poem, a piece of music, and so on.  
4. If adopting an aesthetic attitude means nothing more than ignoring sources 
of distraction and focusing attention on, or paying attention to, the matter at 
hand, then, any sentence about adopting an aesthetic attitude can be 
paraphrased into an equivalent sentence in which the term ‘aesthetic’ only has 
non-aesthetic meaning. 
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5. If any sentence about adopting an aesthetic attitude can be paraphrased into 
an equivalent sentence in which the term ‘aesthetic’ only has non-aesthetic 
meaning, then, belief in an aesthetic attitude is a myth. 
6. Therefore, belief in an aesthetic attitude is a myth. 
Let us link this argument structure to comments Dickie makes in the 
course of making his case.  
Step 1 is based on Dickie’s summary (56) of the way attitude theorists 
such as Sheila Dawson (Dawson 1961) and Jerome Stolnitz (Stolnitz 1960) 
defined ‘aesthetic attitude.’ Step 2 is based on Dickie’s analysis of the concepts 
“distancing” and “being distanced” (57) and on his analysis of the concept 
“disinterested attention” (58).  Step 3 follows logically from Steps 1 and 2.  Dickie 
does not assert Step 4, though he hints at it in his comment (64) that “the 
aesthetic attitude collapses into simple attention.” Dickie also does not assert 
Step 5, though it is needed to validly infer Step 6. 
One way to deal with this argument is to note that ‘one man’s modus 
ponens is another man’s modus tollens.’ Accordingly, here is an equally valid 
argument that starts with the negation of Dickie’s final conclusion, step 6: 
1*.  It is not the case that belief in an aesthetic attitude is a myth. 
2*. Therefore, it is not the case that any sentence about adopting an aesthetic 
attitude can be paraphrased into an equivalent sentence in which the term 
‘aesthetic’ only has non-aesthetic meaning – from 1* and 5 by modus tollens. 
3*. Therefore, it is not the case that adopting an aesthetic attitude means 
nothing more than ignoring sources of distraction and focusing attention on, or 
paying  attention to, the matter at hand – from 2* and 4 by modus tollens. 
4*. Therefore, 3 is false. 1 or 2 or both are also false. 
This strategy is moot unless it is shown that the argument from 1* to 4* is 
sound. 
A basic distinction in the philosophy of mind is between an act (in the 
occurrent or the dispositional sense) and the object it is directed upon. Leaving 
aside whether the mental is the physical, we may legitimately speak of a mental 
act, such as perceiving, as distinct in some sense from a physical object, such as a 
tree, that the act of perceiving happens to be directed upon. Similarly, we may 
legitimately speak of the mental act, such as focusing attention, as distinct in 
some sense from the physical object or event that the act of focusing attention 
happens to be directed upon. 
Regardless of one’s theory about the nature of perception, it can be 
acknowledged that ‘perceiving an object X’ is shorthand for ‘perceiving some 
property F that X has.’ Similarly, focusing attention on an object or event X, at 
least in part, can be understood as shorthand for focusing attention on some 
property F that X has. 
We can focus attention on aesthetic as well as non-aesthetic objects and 
events. Likewise, we can focus attention on aesthetic as well as non-aesthetic 
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properties of an object or event. For example, if one is focusing attention on the 
way compositional details are related to one another in a painting, one is 
focusing attention on an aesthetic property of a painting; while focusing 
attention on the relative height of the actors on the stage is focusing attention on 
a non-aesthetic property of the performance of a play.  
Under what conditions is the act of focusing attention, which is neutral 
taken in the abstract, uniquely aesthetic? The answer seems to be that the act of 
focusing attention on an object or event is uniquely aesthetic provided that it is 
directed upon the aesthetic properties of an object or event to the exclusion of 
other properties. This leads to an intuitive account of adopting a uniquely 
aesthetic attitude toward an object or event: It means focusing attention on 
aesthetic properties to the exclusion of other properties the object or event may 
have.   
So, on this understanding of ‘uniquely aesthetic attitude,’ we have the 
following: 
 Premise 3* is true because adopting a uniquely aesthetic attitude toward 
an object or event means more than ‘ignoring sources of distraction and 
focusing attention on the matter at hand.’  
 Premise 2* is true because sentences about adopting a uniquely aesthetic 
attitude in the sense just explained cannot be paraphrased into an 
equivalent sentence in which the term ‘aesthetic’ only has non-aesthetic 
meaning.  
 Finally, the aesthetic attitude as understood here does not entail 
‘disinterested attention’ as some theorists have suggested. On the 
contrary, adopting a uniquely aesthetic attitude in my sense entails 
focusing attention on the aesthetic properties of an object or event to the 
exclusion of other properties. 
Note that adopting a uniquely aesthetic attitude toward sculptures that 
meet the Prometheus Challenge is conceptually more complex. This is the case 
because special vision is required to focus attention on the aesthetic properties 
of such sculptures, namely, directional vision or seeing-as vision (or both), to the 
exclusion of other properties they might have. 
Here is the definition of ‘adopting a uniquely aesthetic attitude’ I am 
proposing: 
Person S adopts a uniquely aesthetic attitude toward X =df Either (a) S focuses 
attention on aesthetic attributes of X by means of standard perception, ignoring 
other properties X might have,28 or (b) S focuses attention on aesthetic 
attributes of X by means of special perception such as directional vision or 
seeing-as vision (or both), ignoring other properties X might have, including 
                                                        
28 For a Platonic concept of aesthetic vision in the context of film analysis, see Cusmariu 
2015B, 109-111.   
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aesthetic properties on which attention could be focused without special 
perception.29 
Someone sympathetic to Dickie’s critique might respond that this 
definition must further specify what it means to focus attention on aesthetic 
properties, otherwise it is incomplete. For present purposes, however, operating 
at an intuitive level is sufficient.30  
Question: What about Vincent Tomas’ version of the aesthetic attitude, i.e., his 
concept of aesthetic vision (Tomas 1959)? 
Answer: Capturing aesthetic content by means of seeing-as vision refutes 
Vincent Tomas’ view on the nature of aesthetic vision. Here are two key passages: 
When we see things aesthetically our attention is directed toward appearances 
and we do not particularly notice the thing that presents the appearance, nor 
do we care what, if anything, it is that appears. Put somewhat differently, in 
aesthetic vision the ‘what’ or ‘aesthetic object’ that we attend to when, as 
Schopenhauer says, we look ‘simply and solely at the what,’ is an appearance, 
and the question of reality does not arise (Tomas 1959, 53). 
In every case of aesthetic vision, what is attended to is an appearance, and the 
question of what actual object – a picture, a mirror, or a man – presents that 
appearance does not arise (Tomas 1959, 58).  
In Slave Market with the Disappearing Bust of Voltaire, Dali was only 
suggesting we are seeing images of Voltaire and two women. But from this it 
does not follow that “the question of realty does not arise” when we attempt to 
capture the aesthetic content of this picture. Dali put Voltaire’s name in the title 
for a reason, so “the question what actual object presents that appearance” does 
indeed “arise.” We should and do “care what it is that appears.” 
The aesthetic content of this and every other picture Dali made 
exemplifying the same kind of ambiguity cannot be captured by looking “simply 
and solely at the what.” We must see the women’s dresses as Voltaire’s neck and 
vice-versa, as well as see-as the many other ambiguous details Dali put into this 
picture.  
Seeing-as vision is indeed a form of aesthetic vision, as is directional vision. 
What else would they be, considering that they are necessary for the purpose of 
capturing the aesthetic content of works by Picasso, Dali and Lipchitz as well as 
my own?31  
 
                                                        
29 This view of the aesthetic attitude assumes that there are such things as aesthetic properties 
(and relations). A defense of this position can be found in Cusmariu 2016. 
30 See Cusmariu 2016 for refutations of attempts to dispense with aesthetic properties. 
31 The Picasso, Dali and Lipchitz artworks under discussion all predate Tomas’ article, so he 
had ample opportunity to test his views. None are mentioned in his article as potential 
counterexamples.  
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Laws of Logic and the Prometheus Challenge 
Question: Characterizing the Prometheus Challenge as combining incompatible 
attributes seems to suggest that artworks that meet the challenge assert that 
contradictions are in some sense true, which would be an undesirable 
consequence. How do you avoid this consequence?  
Answer: Let us consider the six solution categories in turn and show that none 
assert that contradictions can be true.32 
Category 1, Mirror Imaging 
 On my interpretation, the male mirror image in Les Demoiselles d’Avignon 
(LDA) is not, inconsistently, intended to be literally glued atop the image 
of the crouching female figure. Rather, this is a compositional device 
meant to suggest the presence of someone outside the picture space 
looking at the women inside it. 
 Degas, Manet and Picasso combined incompatibilities between base and 
mirror images to make psychological points. They were not suggesting 
that the concept of mirroring and the relationship between base and 
mirror images shown in their pictures correspond to reality.  
Category 2, Image Overlapping 
 As noted above, a male head atop a female body in LDA is also not 
intended as a literal depiction. Overlapping body parts suggest 
disembodied figures by way of commentary on the revolting nature of 
bordello sex.  
 Also as noted above, seeing-as vision is required to notice the fact that 
the head on top of the croucher is an ambiguous male-female composite 
and serves to identify the two sexual partners.  
 Image overlapping in the Walter, Maar and Roque pictures conveys a 
psychological reality rather than a physical one. Picasso is showing how 
he perceived his relationship these three very different women and how 
they perceived their relationship to him. He was famous for being 
brutally honest in his artwork, even if it meant portraying himself and 
the people he loved in an unfavorable light. 
Category 3, Seeing-As Vision 
Ambiguity is a simple way of dispelling the appearance of inconsistency. To cite a 
famous example from art, consider Magritte’s painting Treachery of Images 
(1929), showing a pipe with an inscription underneath that reads “Ceci nest pas 
                                                        
32 In logic, the operative concept is ‘inconsistent sentence,’ which has a syntactic and a 
semantic meaning. Such technical subtleties do not matter for present purposes. 
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une pipe” (“This is not a pipe.”)33 The inscription will seem contradictory until it 
is realized that the demonstrative pronoun is ambiguous. ‘This’ can be taken to 
refer to the pipe in the picture, in which case the inscription is false; or it can be 
taken to refer to the fact that we are looking at a picture of the pipe, in which 
case the inscription is true. Magritte clearly meant the latter.34 Once the 
ambiguity is realized, the appearance of paradox disappears. 
Artworks requiring seeing-as vision to capture aesthetic content are 
ambiguous in the same way. Thus, Dali was not suggesting in The Image 
Disappears that a woman’s breast can literally be a man’s nostril; Picasso was not 
suggesting in Bull’s Head that a bicycle’s handlebars could literally be a bull’s 
horn; Lipchitz was not suggesting in Mother and Child, II that a child’s legs could 
literally be a bull’s ears; and I was not suggesting in Ariel that a ball a seal was 
balancing could literally be a person’s head. Visual ambiguity is exemplified in all 
these cases; contradictions are not being asserted as true. This is realized once 
special vision is applied.  
Category 4, Directional Vision 
Directional vision removes the appearance of contradiction by requiring 
viewers to shift focus from one direction to another. Once they do so, ambiguity 
becomes apparent.  
My Prometheus (left) suggested pride if seen from left to right and horror 
if seen from right to left. Both cannot be seen at the same time, so there is no 
inconsistency. Similar points apply to my Leda (middle) and my David (right). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
33 Image available at http://collections.lacma.org/node/239578, accessed 3 July 2017. 
34 For Magritte’s comments on this painting, see Torczyner (1979, 71).  
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Category 5, Discontinuous Attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sense data are necessarily indexed to a perceiver at a time. The four views of Eve 
were shown as a sequence for the purpose of explaining a concept. The images 
were taken one after the other 45 degrees of arc apart and thus do not 
correspond to simultaneous sense data. Thus, I was not implying that Eve is 
simultaneously pregnant (View 2) and not pregnant (View1); or holding an apple 
(View 3) and not holding an apple (View 4).  Discontinuous attributes sculptures 
do not assert that contradictions can be true. Moreover, because the sculpture is 
best viewed on a rotating carousel and is thus an event, incompatible events are 
being viewed sequentially and not simultaneously. 
Category 6, Interweaving Forms 
The appearance of contradiction can be dispelled by recalling that sculptures 
under this solution require seeing-as and directional vision to capture aesthetic 
content. The reliance of these modes of vision on ambiguity means that 
contradictions are not being asserted. Counterpoint sculptures are best viewed 
on a rotating carousel. 
Plato’s Critique of Art and the Prometheus Challenge35 
Question: Would Plato have banned Prometheus Challenge art from his ideal 
state? 
Answer: As a metaphysical Platonist,36 I could neither ignore nor postpone this 
question. However, I am able to answer it here only for my own Prometheus 
Challenge artworks. 
                                                        
35 There is a large and growing literature on this topic. See, inter alia, Tate 1928, Grube 1980 
[1935], Verdenius 1949, Golden 1975, and Janaway 1995. Janaway’s book has an excellent 
bibliography. I will not be engaging in any sort of polemic with other interpretations or make 
an extensive effort to justify my own. 
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Here is an outline of what I take to be Plato’s argument against art in Book 
X of Republic (Cooper 1997, 1199-1223):  
1. Art has property M. 
2. Experiences of viewing something that has property M have 
consequence H. 
Therefore, 
3. Experiences of viewing art have consequence H – from 1, 2. 
4. If experiences of viewing art have consequence H, then experiences of 
viewing art taken collectively probably would damage the health and 
welfare of the ideal state.37 
Therefore, 
5. Experiences of viewing art taken collectively probably would damage 
the health and welfare of the ideal state – from 3, 4. 
6. If experiences of viewing art taken collectively probably would 
damage the health and welfare of the ideal state, then experiences of 
viewing art should be banned in the ideal state. 
Therefore, 
7. Experiences of viewing art should be banned in the ideal state – from 
5, 6. 
This outline makes it easier to understand what Plato found problematic 
and how he suggested the problem should be handled in his ideal state. 
First, the outline makes clear that Plato’s critique of art is not aimed at art 
as such.38 After all, art that no one ever sees is causally inert. Thus, the argument 
could not have used (2*) instead of (2) because (2*) is false: 
         2*      Something that has property M has consequence H. 
Second, it is also clear that H is unlikely to have the sort of impact that 
premise (4) claims if ‘viewing’ means sporadic, isolated or otherwise limited 
exposure to art, e.g., artist colonies and the like. Thus, Plato must be taken to 
argue that harmful consequences would arise at the societal level only if art (a) 
were to be made available to the general public and (b) unrestricted viewership 
                                                                                                                                           
36 My interest in Plato’s metaphysics began in graduate school and led to a Ph.D. dissertation 
at Brown University in 1977 titled “A Platonist Theory of Properties.” Material from the 
dissertation eventually became journal articles. See Cusmariu 1978A, 1978B, 1978C, 1979A, 
1979B, 1980, 1985 and 2016. 
37 As Grube points out (1980 [1935], 189), the critique of art is aimed at legislating for the 
ideal state envisioned in Republic, which “exists in theory, [not] anywhere on earth.” (Cooper 
1997, 1199, 592b)  
38 Art training in drawing could be useful in architecture and building construction, while 
stone carving could be useful in masonry. They would not be banned in the ideal state.  
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was permitted. It is this that the ideal state must prevent by passing laws 
banning displays of art. Plato, in effect, advocates censorship.39 
Question: What are M and H?  
Answer: M is mimesis. H is epistemic harm that Plato argues is caused by 
exposure to M.  
Question: What is mimetic art? 
Answer: Here are some relevant passages from Book X of Republic:  
Yet, in a certain way, the painter does make a bed, doesn’t he? 
Yes, he makes the appearance of one. (Republic 596e8-9, Cooper 1997, 1200) 
Now, consider this. We say that a maker of an image – an imitator – knows 
nothing about that which is but only about its appearance. Isn’t that so? 
Yes. (Republic 601b7-c2, Cooper 1997, 1205)   
Then what do you think [a painter] does to a bed? 
He imitates it. He is an imitator of what others make. (Republic 597d8-9, Cooper 
1997, 1201) 
If you look at a bed from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a 
different bed each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all 
different? And is that also the case with other things? 
That’s the way it is – it appears different without being so. (Republic 598a5-a8, 
Cooper 1997, 1202) 
Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it 
imitate that which is as it is, or does it imitate that which appears as it appears? 
Is it an imitation of appearances or of truth? 
Of appearances. (Republic 598a9-b3, Cooper 1997, 1202) 
These passages suggest the following definition applicable to visual 
mimetic art: 40 
D1. A work of visual art W about X is mimetic-1 =df W is a representation41 of 
the appearance X presents.42  
                                                        
39 Movies also have consequence H even though this “river of shadows” (Solnit 2004) is by and 
large intended as entertainment. For Platonist themes in the context of film, see Cusmariu 
2015B. 
40 However, Janaway writes (1995, 106): “We cannot hope for a single definition of mimesis 
covering all uses Plato makes of the term.” 
41 The term ‘representation’ covers more examples of visual art and is therefore preferable to 
Plato’s term ‘imitation.’ Defining ‘representation’ is too complicated to be attempted here. 
42 X could be a real or a fictional object and the appearance represented in W might not be 
contemporaneous with the date of W. Thus, historical or religious artworks as well as 
artworks depicting fictional objects can be mimetic according to D1. W could be about 
multiple objects and still be mimetic. See D2 below.  
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Question: Why not define mimetic art in terms of resemblance or approximation 
with respect to how an object appears rather than representation? 
Answer: Here is that definition: 
D1*. A work of visual art W about X is mimetic-1* =df W resembles or 
approximates the appearance X presents. 
This won’t do. (a) Plato’s paradigm case of mimesis is ‘copy’ or ‘imitation’ 
in part because ‘art is a copy of a copy’ entails ‘art is twice removed from the 
truth’ but does not entail ‘art resembles a copy’; (b) it is unclear whether viewing 
‘resemblance art’ would have consequence H; hence, (c) should be banned in the 
ideal state.  
Question: Are your Prometheus Challenge artworks mimetic according to D1? 
Answer: There are four categories of solutions to consider. 
Category 1. Seeing-As Vision  
 
 
Ariel can be seen-as a seal and also as a spectator at the 
circus. Neither is (or was intended to be) a representation of 
the appearance a seal or a circus spectator presents. I used 
visual ambiguity to suggest that viewers consider 
circumstances in which they are prone to ‘act like a trained 
seal.’ My other seeing-as sculpture, Swan Lake, is also not D1-
mimetic because no swan presents an appearance that 
includes the wake it leaves behind gliding on a lake as part of 
its body. 
 
Category 2. Directional Vision 
 
 
My Prometheus and my David are abstract art, so D1 does 
not apply. Leda is based on Greek mythology. The attributes 
apparent from opposite directions – before the swan (Zeus) 
from left-to-right, and months later from right-to-left – 
cannot meaningfully be said to be representations of the 
appearance of a mythological being. The two views at most 
resemble the female figure in profile, which does not mean 
that Leda is D1-mimetic. 
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Category 3. Discontinuous Attributes 
Phenomenalist sculptures are obviously not D1-mimetic. However, perhaps a 
definition of mimesis for such sculptures can be formulated that is consistent 
with Plato’s paradigm case of mimetic art. 
D2. A sculpture W is mimetic-2 =df Sense-data in W correspond to sense-data 
associated with familiar objects of experience. 
It might seem that a Phenomenalist sculpture such as Alar satisfies D2. 
However, ‘correspond’ cannot be understood literally here. The views 
shown only suggest association with familiar sense data under an interpretation. 
Views 1-4 do not literally correspond to sense-data associated with actual bird 
wings, while View 5 does not literally correspond to sense-data associated with a 
blade of fire. Real wings consist of feathers attached to bones linked together in 
various ways and do not literally look like what we see in Views 1-4. These views 
are an artist’s concept of a wing rather than strict correspondence in the ‘copy’ 
sense Plato intends. The same is true of View 5: A blade of fire is not a solid 
object. Finally, Alar shows an aesthetic relationship between the alabaster stone 
and the three-part base underneath, not a literal relationship. Wings are 
attached very differently to the body of a bird. 
Note that D2 requires all sense-data of a Phenomenalist sculpture to 
correspond to sense-data associated with familiar objects of experience. 
Therefore, Phenomenalist sculptures are not D2-mimetic.  
Question: Why must correspondence hold for all sense data? Isn’t it sufficient 
for the sculpture to be mimetic provided that correspondence holds for some 
sense-data? 
Answer: Here is that definition: 
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D2*. A sculpture W is mimetic-2* =df Some sense-data in W correspond to 
sense-data associated with familiar objects of experience. 
D2* entails that a Phenomenalist sculpture can ‘go in and out’ of mimesis, 
so to speak, from one viewing angle to the next. It seems clear, however, that 
mimesis is an all-or-nothing concept for Plato. To use Plato’s example, this means 
that one and the same bed cannot present mimetic as well as non-mimetic 
appearances from one viewing angle to the next. If it did, we could not identify it 
as a bed or as the same bed.       
Category 4. Interweaving Forms 
Mereological sculptures such as Counterpoint 8 are not mimetic-1 or mimetic-2; 
therefore, a new definition is needed. 
D3. A sculpture W is mimetic-3 =df All part-whole relationships exemplified in 
W correspond to relationships exemplified by familiar objects of experience.  
While some volumes in Counterpoint 8 are identifiable as representations 
of female figures, part-whole relationships seen in their totality and from every 
viewing angle do not correspond to those exemplified by familiar objects of 
experience. Thus, Mereological sculptures are not D3-mimetic. 
Because my Prometheus Challenge sculptures are not mimetic according 
to any of the Platonist definitions considered, it is reasonable to conclude that 
premise (1) of the argument outline is false if M is mimesis, hence the resulting 
argument is unsound. 
Question: Perhaps your Prometheus Challenge sculptures should be banned 
because the experience of viewing them is epistemically harmful. What about 
that? 
Answer: The True and The Good were fundamental Forms for Plato, so he 
probably would have been sympathetic to W.K. Clifford’s “ethics of belief” (1879, 
163-205), which can be construed as an attempt to combine the two Forms. Thus, 
Plato probably would have agreed that there is a prima facie duty for citizens of 
his ideal state to acquire true or rational beliefs as well as a duty to avoid false or 
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irrational beliefs. Therefore, he probably would have regarded as epistemically 
harmful experiences that would interfere with carrying out these duties. This 
suggests the following definition: 
D4. Having experience E is epistemically harmful for person S =Df (i) Having E 
would discourage S from acquiring true or rational beliefs, or (ii) having E 
would encourage S to acquire false or irrational beliefs. 
Here is a revised version of Plato’s critique of art that relies on D4.  
(3*) Experiences of viewing art are epistemically harmful. 
(4*) If experiences of viewing art are epistemically harmful, then experiences of 
viewing art taken collectively probably would damage the health and welfare of 
the ideal state. 
Therefore, 
(5) Experiences of viewing art taken collectively probably would damage the 
health and welfare of the ideal state – from 3*, 4*. 
(6) If experiences of viewing art taken collectively probably would damage the 
health and welfare of the ideal state, then experiences of viewing art should be 
banned in the ideal state. 
Therefore, 
(7) Experiences of viewing art should be banned in the ideal state – from 5, 6. 
Question: This argument is valid. Which premise do you deny? 
Answer: Grube writes (1980 [1935], 187): 
Plato extends the meaning of artistic, cultured in art, far beyond art itself, to 
apply to the lover of all beauty, who (we may supply the thought from later 
passages) is again none other than the philosophos, the thinker. Such a one, 
were he an artist, Plato would accept and indeed welcome.  There is nowhere 
any description of the type of work that he could create beyond the general 
principles  mentioned already. That such works however are not impossible, 
and that they would be far more than a mere copy of things, we gather from 
scattered references: the artist could in the first place combine differently what 
he sees in  nature, though one doubts whether any great art could result from 
this.43 
According to Grube, Plato seems to have been confident that a 
philosopher-artist would understand the need to avoid mimesis and, moreover, 
would produce artworks that were “far more than a mere copy of things.” For 
purposes of the above argument, however, this is irrelevant. After all, artworks 
that are ‘far more than a mere copy of things’ may still be epistemically harmful 
in the sense of D4. The same may be true of non-mimetic artworks based on a 
philosophical theory such as Phenomenalism or Mereology; artworks that were 
created by “combining the features of different things,” as Plato put it at Republic 
                                                        
43 George Grube died in 1982. 
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488a5 (Cooper 1997, 1111); and even artworks that incorporated Plato’s notion 
of interweaving forms from Sophist. Unless it is shown that viewing such 
artworks is not epistemically harmful in the sense of D4, the above argument 
goes through and the ideal state would have no choice but to ban them despite 
their unique lineage. 
To decide the issue with respect to my Prometheus Challenge sculptures, 
we need one more definition: 
D5. Having experience E is epistemically helpful for person S =Df (i) Having E 
would encourage S to acquire true or rational beliefs, or (ii) having E would 
discourage S from acquiring false or irrational beliefs. 
I’d like to show that, under their intended interpretations, my Prometheus 
Challenge sculptures are epistemically helpful. Therefore, premise (3*) of the 
above argument is false and this argument is also unsound. 
Category 1: Seeing-As-Vision 
Ariel is epistemically helpful. Using the spectator-trained seal combination of 
attributes, the piece invites the viewer to ponder hard questions: To what extent 
is free choice present in our lives? Are we acting out of desires that are genuinely 
our own or are we caving to outside pressures, perhaps without even realizing it? 
Is self-deception ever a part of the decision-making process? 
Category 2: Directional Vision   
David is epistemically helpful. The sculpture is intended to encourage admiration 
toward acts of heroism while recognizing as legitimate and even rational the 
visceral fear experienced on the battlefield at the prospect of violent death.  
Prometheus is epistemically helpful. The sculpture is intended to 
encourage admiration toward acts of defiance in the service of conscience while 
recognizing as legitimate and even rational the rage felt at the cruelty of the 
punishment imposed. 
Category 3: Discontinuous Attributes 
Alar is epistemically helpful. The sculpture invites viewers to consider that 
something beautiful might also be dangerous, e.g., ‘every rose has thorns.’ 
Eve is epistemically helpful. Viewers can ponder the moral implications of 
the Biblical story as the pieces turns slowly on a carousel, e.g., the consequences 
of disobeying a divine command and yielding to temptation. 
Category 4: Interweaving Forms 
Counterpoint sculptures were epistemically helpful for me because each one 
encouraged a true belief about a potentially productive aesthetic relationship 
between two forms of art with an event ontology, (my) sculpture and music. This 
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belief began with Counterpoint 1 and was confirmed by subsequent sculptures 
that also “combine the features of different things” in a way that resembles how 
voices are combined in music to produce a unified, coherent whole.   
In conclusion, Plato should “accept and indeed welcome” my Prometheus 
Challenge sculptures in his ideal state, as they are “far more than a mere copy of 
things.”44 
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